This article gives a brief look at the history of security in computing and a look at some of the existing security techniques. New threats introduced by pervasive computing are considered and security of existing link-layer protocols and applicability of higher-layer protocols is reviewed. Possible directions of the future of the security of pervasive computing are also considered.
INTRODUCTION
This article tries to give an overview of the security aspects of pervasive computing. Security as a whole is a very complex issue, and it will not be possible to go very deep into specifics, so the target will be more of an overview of relevant issues. The following sections will cover the current state of the art, new threats introduced by pervasive computing and the techniques used to counter them. The rest of this section will try to give a brief look into the history of computer security.
The need for security
In the dawn of computing, the computers filled whole rooms. They were operated by dedicated operators and the security guards guarding the computer rooms were probably the first instance of computer security.
As computers evolved, timesharing and terminals were invented. Now operators were no longer the only users. Students, professors, scientist and engineers found use for the computers and operating system designers had to think of ways to restrict users from reading confidential data, destroying data that did not belong to them and doing countless other acts which could compromise the security of the system. This problem has never been solved in a satisfactory way, because of factors described later.
The next major step was the networking of computers. The first large-scale effort was ARPANET, a network created for Department of Defense in USA. This network later evolved into NFSNET and then into the Internet.
Networking created new problems: eavesdropping on transmitted data and malicious computers on the networks. As corporations began to use the networks, more and more financially important data was being transferred.
Still new problems were introduced by the personal computers. No longer were computers something afforded only by universities, corporations and government agencies. Anyone could buy a computer and it would no longer be administered by a professional system administrator, who was able to keep the system up to date. In combination with networks, this resulted in a large number of computers connected to the Internet and vulnerable to widely-known attacks.
Nearly all of the security issues encountered in mainframes, networking and personal computing are also present in the field of pervasive computing, and in some cases as even larger problems than before.
New applications, new threats
A classic example is an attacker switching off a computer-controlled freezer, resulting in food spoilage. As the use of computers keeps expanding into new areas, new, completely unanticipated threats keep popping up, as any reader of the Usenet newsgroup comp.risks knows.
• Consider a contactless smartcard functioning as a bus ticket. The card requires no confirmation for paying for a trip. Thus, in principle a malicious reader could consume all trips from a ticket without the owner of the ticket noticing anything until afterwards. Same applies to other contactless small devices handling money. With readers requiring physical contact this is not such a problem, but contactless readers can communicate with the card from the pocket of a passer-by. For ensuring secure transactions, some sort of user interface is needed on the card itself.
• Consider a PDA used to store confidential data. Right now, lack of processing power makes storing the data in encrypted form (like it is done on laptop computers) impractical. Instead, some form of password access control is used. This is very weak protection and serious attackers will encounter no trouble when digging the data from the device.
Why the security has often been the last on the agenda
Security costs money. It has to be taken into account in all aspects of design and even then, implementation of the design can leave gaping holes in the final prod-uct. Extra work in design and implementation takes man-hours and sometimes makes the product less usable and less capable; but then, fixing the holes and the effects of attacks later costs money too. Too often, researchers and corporations have been unwilling to put the necessary effort into making the protocols and products secure. Hopefully, as security issues are being taken more and more seriously, the security is taken into account from the beginning as new products are being designed.
OVERVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE ART
This section will aim to cover the current state of security in pervasive computing.
Existing security techniques
This section will describe some of the techniques used in computer security and will consider their applicability to pervasive computing. These techniques are the basic building blocks of security procols. A good source for further information is Bruce Schneier's book Applied Cryptography, (Schneier, 1996) .
Symmetric Cryptalgorithms
Used for preserving the confidentiality of stored or transmitted data. Ease of implementation in systems with small amounts of RAM like smart cards is often taken into account, but is still often problematic, since most algorithms are computationally quite demanding, and some of them require a largish state to be stored. Most PDAs, mobile phones and comparable devices have nowadays enough processing power to run most symmetric algorithms with great enough speed, but the choices for smaller 8-bit devices with only kilobytes of memory are somewhat limited, and achieved data rates are usually modest. Even though general-purpose computers have increased in computing power, it seems that the computing power of the smallest devices has remained quite constant. Instead of increasing power, decreasing costs have permitted new applications for microprocessors. Since this theme is quite central to pervasive computing, is can be assumed that the situation will remain the same at least for some time.
Asymmetric Cryptalgorithms Asymmetric cryptalgorithms are algorithms which use a different key for encryption and decryption, meaning that parties who wish to transfer data confidentially can exchange their encryption keys over an insecure connection, which is not possible with symmetric cryptalgorithms. Asymmetric cryptalgorithms are computationally much more intensive than symmetric cryptalgorithms, and this is quite a problem for devices with little computational power, like smartcards and smaller PDAs. Asymmetric cryptalgorithms are a basic building block of many higher-level security protocols, and implementing them in small devices requires faster processors, hardware acceleration or long delays while computation is taking place.
Certification Authorities Two parties exchanging their public keys over an insecure connection are vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack, in which the attacker substitutes the public keys with fakes. The only way to prevent this attack is to verify that the received public key actually belongs to the sender. One way of verifying this is using a certification authority, who signs the public key together with information about the owner's identity. The whole scheme is commonly called the Public Key Infrastructure, or PKI in short, and is currently breaking into wide use with projects such as HST in Finland, which implements a state-wide certification authority and certificates on personal identity cards embedded with a microprocessor.
Aspects of security in pervasive computing
This section will consider the different aspects of security in pervasive computing and different solutions available for it. The aspects covered here are physical security and network security, which can be thought of as logical, more abstract form of security than physical security. Network security can be also called protocol security, since all network traffic consists of different protocols running between two (or in some cases more than two) parties.
Physical security and access control
Physical security is mostly about preventing unauthorized use of devices. Devices handling money in some form or capable of inflicting costs on the owner (like mobile phones) will need to authenticate the user to prevent misuse, as will devices storing private data. There are three main ways of authentication:
Checking what the user knows This method is currently in wide use and is perhaps the most useful for small devices. PIN:s and passwords fall into this category.
Checking what the user owns Universally used in building access control and in access control of some devices in form of various keycards and electronic tokens, but perhaps not very useful for small devices. Permanently installed devices could use this type of authentication, but using it for small personal devices would not necessarily make much sense.
Checking what the user is like Least used form of autentication so far. This is also called biometric authentication and involves checking the user's physical characteristics like fingerprints. Used mainly in high-security installations, but fingerprint-activated PDA:s would not be infeasible either.
It is usually considered that good authentication involves more than one of the above three forms. For example, ATM machines require a physical card and a PIN code. Using only either one would result in radically worse security. Of course, the required level of security depends on the severity of the consequences of unauthorized use.
Network security
Physical security is challenging, but network security is generally considered much more complex field and risks linked to it are much more diverse. As the networking and internetworking of smaller and smaller devices increases, the risks increase. Wireless networks increase the opportunities for passive attacks (eavesdropping, logging passwords from the net) and active attacks (hijacking connections). The following sections will cover some of the methods available today, their applicability for pervasive computing and their security.
Security in current data-link layer protocols
Since the security extensions in the IP protocol are not yet in widespread use, and the security of many application-layer protocols is still questionable, the data-link layer often becomes the first and last stand against attackers. This is especially the case with broadcast-type wireless links, which make the eavesdropping easier than ever before.
Unfortunately, the security is too often only nominal, enough to stop the casual would-be-crackers but not enough to thwart serious attackers. The next sections will give a quick view into the security features of a couple of different protocols for mobile applications.
GSM
The encryption algorithm A5/1 of the GSM system has been found insecure, details of cryptanalysis can be found in an article by Nikita Biryukov and Adi Shamir, (Biryukov & Shamir, 1999) . With different speed/memory tradeoffs, the attack requires either two minutes of conversation and one second of computation or two seconds of conversation and several minutes of computation. This, of course, requires catching the GSM traffic from the air, something not possible for casual attackers, but not impossible for dedicated individuals.
GPRS is also vulnerable to the same attack. The WAP protocol has more layers, offering greater security, but is not without risks; the security protocols run between the WAP application and the WAP gateway, and often the connection will continue, unprotected, through the Internet from the WAP gateway to actual server housing the services. This gives attackers on the Internet a chance to listen or modify the traffic, which prevents using things like mobile banking applications without yet another layer of security or some other, often inconvenient, solution.
WaveLAN/802.11
The security of 802.11 has been shown to be quite weak, as shown in an article by Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg and David Wagner, (Borisov et al. , 2001) . The encryption algorithm is quite secure by itself, but as often happens, the used in a manner which makes the whole system vulnerable to an attack. Unlike GSM, no custom hardware is needed for the passive attacks (eavesdropping), because of the broadcast nature of the network.
Bluetooth
Details of the Bluetooth system can be found from the Bluetooth specification, (Bluetooth, 2001 ).
The Bluetooth system includes encryption and authentication for security. The security of the system can be classified as adequate for light use, but containing enough problems to discourage transmitting highly valuable data. An article about the security aspects of Bluetooth is available on the web, (Vainio, 2000) .
Applicable upper-layer protocols
This section will present some of the security protocols available above the datalink layer and will discuss their suitability for use in pervasive computing.
As the previous section showed, the data-link layer protocols are not secure enough for important applications. They will prevent casual attacks, but if stronger security is needed, upper-layer security protocols must be used.
IPSec
IPSec is a common name for security extensions for the IP protocol. These include the security transforms applied to IP packets to hide their contents and protect them against tampering, and protocols for exchanging keys securely. IPSec provides end-to-end security between two hosts exchanging IP packets, which protects all traffic even when the data-link layer and application layer protocols are insecure (as often is the case).
Implementing the security on the IP layer is good because the applications won't need to be aware of it. On the other hand, the implementation needs to be at a low level, which makes it more challenging to write.
Barring unforeseen vulnerabilities in the protocol, implementation or the encryption algorithms, IPSec is generally considered very secure. A downside is that even a basic implementation requires several hundreds of kilobytes of code and enough processor power for running asymmetric cryptalgorithms, which prevents using it in small applications. Still, it's quite conceivable that we would be running IPSec on the 3G mobile phones when doing security-critical things like remote control of home appliances and mobile commerce.
TLS/SSL
TLS or Transport Layer Security is a protocol for securing the traffic on a streamoriented connection like TCP connection. It can be used to secure the traffic between a client and a server, both of which need to support the protocol. The underlying system, on the other hand, isn't important for the protocol, because only basic reliable data transfer is required from it. On general-purpose computers this is a significant benefit, compared to IPSec, which usually required changes in the operating system kernel.
Like IPSec, an implementation of TLS requires a largish amount of code and processing power, which can be a problem in small systems, depending on the completeness of the implementation.
SSH
SSH or Secure Shell protocol, like TLS, works on top of a stream-oriented connection. Unlike TLS, it doesn't just secure the connection; instead, it offers the possibility of running multiple terminal sessions, file transfers and other data streams securely on top of the insecure connection. Also, it offers quite sophisticated services for authenticating the user.
Like IPSec and TLS, an implementation of the SSH protocol requires a largish amount of code and processing power, again depending on the completeness of the implementation. Implementations of the SSH protocol have appeared Palm Pilot PDAs and recently there has been a port to Nokia 9210 mobile phone running Symbian OS.
BIGGEST THREATS
This section will present some of the biggest threats introduced by the pervasive computing and if possible, ways of preventing them.
Hitting where it hurts
The destroyed contents of a hard disk can be restored from backups, but spoiled contents of a fridge or a freezer are harder and costlier to replace. Even more serious are threats against life-support equipment. There have been cases in which software malfunctions have resulted in deaths. It may be only a matter time until a malfunction intentionally caused by an outside party causes a death of someone.
Right now, a great emphasis is put on security and correctness life-support equipment software. Still, unforeseen consequences, arising when a number of devices are connected together or otherwise work as a group, will make writing totally safe software a challenging task.
Trouble on the road
Let's imagine a trekker in the wilderness or with a new-generation mobile phone for getting weather forecasts from the Internet and calling for help in case of an accident. Suddenly the phone goes totally dead, hit by the latest worm targetting mobile phones. Back home the software might be reinstallable or restorable from backups, but in the middle of nowhere, there might be nothing to be done.
Products meant to be used in emergencies need a higher grade of security than home computers. Firmware upgrade must require some sort of user intervention (like flipping a switch) or it may be corrupted by malicious software.
Wide-scale attacks
Security problems usually follow a certain pattern:
• Discovery of a vulnerability
• Exploiting the vulnerability
• Fixing the vulnerability Internet gives the attackes an unprecendented opportunity for wide-scale attacks. So far we have seen a number of viruses and worms that exploit security vulnerabilities in commonly used software packages, and this is likely to continue, until the frequency of the vulnerabilities starts to decrease. Now, if we see an increase of internet-connected home appliances, vehicles, and similar devices which have control (directly or indirectly) over the physical world instead of just data storage, we could see an increase in the destructiveness of the attacks. For example, a hypothetical "NIMDA-BMW" virus which corrupts the internet-upgradeable ABS firmware of cars could have quite serious consequences.
There are only two ways of preventing the large-scale attacks:
1. No connection to the Internet 2. Making the systems actually secure
The first solution is clearly a bad idea. Some devices (too small for a user interface of their own) might limit their communication to a short-range Bluetooth interface to a PDA, but if the PDA is connected the the Internet, the way to the device is indirectly open from the Internet. Limiting even indirect connections would negate many of the gains of pervasive computing, since it would prevent networking the new devices.
The second solution is a bit problematic too, since it's very hard to make a totally secure system. Still, taking security more seriously than some operating system vendors do today is a must in the future.
FUTURE GUIDELINES
This section will present some possible directions where the development of pervasive computing might be headed security-wise.
Future of good security
If the security aspects are taken seriously, the pervasive computing and especially networking aspects of it might result in great benefits. This will require effort from product vendors and understanding from the users. Both of these requirements are difficult, but not impossible to achieve.
Future of bad security
Another possibility is that vendors will rush their products on the market, resulting in half-baked software, requiring many field upgrades before it can be called stable. They might also willfully neglect all aspects of security that might be inconvenient for the users, in order to compete in usability. All this might expose the whole infrastructure to devastating attacks later on.
Fortunately, the security-consciousness has gotten an increasing amount of attention from the media, and security features (even though not usually effective) in new protocols show that security is being taken seriously.
Future of ugly security
A third possibility is that governments will become heavily involved in the technology. This might involve replacing all cash with traceable electronic transactions, positional tracking of mobile transmitters, increasing electronic surveillance and maybe even government-mandated backdoors in the security procotols. Where this might eventually lead is open to debate.
CONCLUSIONS
The security in pervasive computing is a complex issue and currently in somewhat bad shape, since most of the lower-level protocols are not secure and the the use of the more secure higher-level protocols is fairly limited.
Latest events (the repeated wide-scale worm attacks on the Internet) have shown that companies will no longer get away with ignoring security, and this hopefully applies to pervasive computing as well. How the field will develop remains to be seen, but it is probable that we will see the introduction of higher-level standard protocols like IP security extensions into small devices. This will make the security of the lower-level procotols largely irrelevant and is perhaps the best long-term solution for network security. The physical security will still need to be designed on a case-to-case basis.
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